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Abstract 
This paper assesses the comparative impact of the 2007 global financial crisis 
on the short and long-term performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the 
Asian-Pacific emerging markets of Thailand, China, South Korea, and Malaysia. Our 
results indicate that the short-term performance or underpricing of Thai IPOs 
increased from 19% to 44% between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. IPOs in 
each of the three other emerging markets experienced a reduction in underpricing 
after the financial crisis. While our results are consistent with previous IPO research, 
the degree of underpricing in each emerging market exceeded the levels found in 
studies of IPOs in developed countries. In terms of the long-term performance of 
IPOs, our results suggest that IPOs in Thailand, China, and South Korea performed 
better in the post-crisis period, while Malaysian IPOs performed worse. Our overall 
findings suggest that the 2007 financial crisis affected IPO performance and 
economic growth in each of the markets studied. 
    
K e y w o r d s :  Benchmark-adjusted returns; Emerging markets; Financial crisis; 
IPO; Performance; Underpricing.  
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1. Introduction 
An initial public offering (IPO) is a process by which a private company 
makes its first sale of shares to the general public with the assistance of an 
investment bank. An issuer sells its shares to an investment bank (the ‘underwriter’) 
who then re-sells the issuer’s shares to the public, via a stock exchange. IPO 
offerings are often underpriced since a share’s offer price (the price offered to the 
company by the underwriter) is likely to be lower than its closing price on the first 
day of trading. If the difference between these two price points is multiplied by the 
number of shares sold the resulting amount equals the money “left on the table” by 
the issuing company. During the 1990s, U.S IPO issuers paid $13 billion in fees to 
underwriters but left more than $27 billion on the table (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). 
As a result, many studies have focused on investigating the short-term (underpricing) 
and long-term performance of IPOs (e.g., Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Other work has focused on fluctuations 
within the total volume of IPOs in relation to aggregate capital demands of private 
companies (Lowry, 2003) and the valuation of IPOs using comparable firm multiples 
(Kim and Ritter, 1999).  
Despite this previous work, Yong (2007) identifies that relatively little is 
known about IPO activity in certain Asian markets. Recent research suggests that the 
Asia-Pacific region leads world markets in terms of the growth and support of IPOs. 
During 2012, the Asia-Pacific region accounted for 57% and 44% of total worldwide 
IPOs and total global capital raised from IPOs. More specifically, the largest IPO in 
2012, apart from that of Facebook, was undertaken by the Malaysian firm, Felda. 
Within the Asian-Pacific region, the majority of IPO activity is conducted in China, 
Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. Of these, Thailand, China, 
South Korea, and Malaysia are classified as  emerging markets. Despite the relative 
importance of IPOs in these emerging markets, few studies have investigating IPO 
activity in the region. As a result, the present study focuses on IPO activity in four 
specific Asian-Pacific emerging markets: Thailand, China, South Korea, and 
Malaysia. The paper does this by providing a comparative assessment as to how the 
2007 global financial crisis affected IPO activity in each country by investigating the 
relative short and long-term performance of IPOs in each market during the five 
years immediately before, and after the 2007 global financial crisis. 
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Event study methodology is used to evaluate the short-term and long-term 
performance of IPOs in each country using 1 day and 36 month event windows, 
respectively. Short-term performance is measured using the market-adjusted 
abnormal return, and long-term performance is calculated using the cumulative 
average market-adjusted return. The total numbers of observations in each country 
ranged from 220 to 1,300 observations and include ten years of IPO data that cover 
the period from 1st January 2003 to 31st December 2012. 
The results of this study suggest that the short-term performance or 
underpricing of Thai IPOs increased from 19% to 44% between the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods. In contrast, each of the three other emerging markets studied 
experienced a reduction in IPO underpricing after the financial crisis. In China, 
underpricing decreased from 114% to 41.5%, in South Korea it declined from 43.7% 
to 27.9%, and in Malaysia it fell from 30.1% to 11.3%.  
In terms of the long-term performance of IPOs, the results of this study 
suggest that in Thailand, China, and South Korea, IPOs performed better in the post-
crisis period, while Malaysian IPOs performed worse. The 36 months CARs for IPOs 
in each country during the pre-crisis and post crisis periods were: Thailand 7.5% and 
43.1%, China 5% and 25%, South Korea 18.9% and 50.5%, and Malaysia -25.8% 
and -30.9%.  
The rest of this study is structured as follows: section two critically evaluates 
the theoretical framework of short-term performance (underpicing) and long-term 
performance of IPOs. In addition it presents the empirical evidence of short-term and 
long-term performance of IPOs in each of the four emerging Asian-pacific countries. 
Section three discusses the sample data selection procedure and the methodology 
used to investigate this study’s research objectives. Section four presents the research 
findings and a final section concludes this paper. 
  
2. Literature review 
This section critically evaluates the existing theoretical and empirical literature on 
IPOs with a specific focus on the issues of short-term (underpricing) and long-term 
performance of IPOs. 
 
4 
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
The ‘abnormal’ positive return achieved during the first trading day of an IPO 
has been an intriguing phenomenon for decades. Ljungqvist (2007) defines 
underpricing as “the percentage difference between the price at which the IPO shares 
were sold to investors (the offer price) and the price at which the shares subsequently 
trade in the market”. Since the 1970s, there has been a great deal of research 
dedicated to explaining and providing possible reasons as to why new issuances of 
equity are usually under-priced (Ibbotson, 1975; and Logue, 1973). 
There are many theoretical paths in the relevant literature trying to interpret IPOs 
underpricing. Information asymmetry between the market participants in IPOS is a 
key element for the majority of the different theoretical explanations offered. 
More recently, Rock (1986) provides a model that explains the underpricing 
phenomena of IPOs by suggesting that there is asymmetric information among 
investors, with certain parties holding superior information that could signal to other 
uninformed investors about whether an IPO is a good or bad investment. As a result, 
the underwriter must price the shares at a discount to attract the uninformed investors 
(Rock, 1986). 
 
2.1.1 Asymmetric information theory 
When a firm goes public, there are normally three main participants in this 
process: the issuing firm, the underwriter (investment bank), and the investors. In an 
asymmetric information model, it is believed that information is not equally shared 
among the three participating groups. In other words, certain parties have more 
information than the others. Under this theoretical model, investors are classified into 
two groups: informed and uninformed investors. Rock (1986) suggests that informed 
investors (parties holding superior information) could signal to other uninformed 
investors about whether an IPO is a good or bad investment. As a result, the 
underwriter must price the shares at a discount to attract the uninformed investors. 
In a model devised by Baron (1982), when a firm issues an IPO it hires an 
investment bank to perform three functions: underwriting, advising, and distribution 
of the IPOs. An important assumption of this model is that the investment bank has 
superior knowledge of the capital market than the firm itself. A firm that has 
uncertainty and less information about the market demand for its IPO would be more 
willing to accept a lower offer price for its stock. As a result, the greater the level of 
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underpricing, the investment bank has more incentive to perform better in selling the 
IPO.  
2.1.2 Underwriter reputation theory 
This theory suggests that underpricing can be partly explained by reputation 
of the underwriting institution. As underpricing is affecting “ex-ante” uncertainty, 
issuing firms aim to hire reputable underwriters. Beatty and Ritter (1986) suggest 
that there is a positive relationship between the ex-ante uncertainty about an IPO’s 
value and the eventual underpricing of that IPO. They also argue that an investment 
banker is the main enforcer of underpricing. While an investment banker may not be 
able to perfectly forecast the value of the issuing firms, bankers who price the shares 
“off the line” (too high or too low) will be punished by the market, so that those 
investment bankers lose market share in subsequent periods. 
Nevertheless, the underwriter reputation theory is challenged by the 
inconsistency of its predictions. For example, Cooney et al. (2001) discovered a 
reverse relationship between underwriter reputation and the degree of underpricing in 
work conducted on a sample of IPOs during the period 1981-1998. Their results 
indicated a negative relationship between the reputation of underwriters and 
underpricing during the 1980s, but the relationship was found to be positive in IPOs 
completed during the 1990s. Despite these results, Cooney et al. suggest that 
underwriter reputation theory is still valid if one applies certain classifications to 
screen samples. 
2.1.3 Owner Dispersion Theory 
This theory suggests that owners of issuing firms ensure that IPOs are 
oversubscribed (Brennan and Franks, 1997). If investor demand is more than the 
supply of shares available, the shares will be rationed to investors. By using 
underpricing to create a surplus in demand, the issuer can control the allocation of 
post-IPO ownership strategically through the share allocation process in order to 
retain control after the IPO takes place. 
Booth and Chua (1996) argue that the issuers demand both a preferable 
ownership structure and liquidity in the secondary market for the shares issued. Such 
demands create an incentive for issuers to underprice IPOs, as promoting 
oversubscription helps the issuer to increase the liquidity of their shares in the 
secondary market because if the firm’s shares are held by a broad group of investors 
they will have higher liquidity. 
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2.1.4 Lawsuit Avoidance Theory 
In the United States of America (USA), the Securities Act of 1933 requires 
that all signatories to a prospectus are liable for any material omissions within it. As 
a result, Tinic (1988) develops the hypothesis that underpricing is a form of 
insurance against the potential legal liability and associated damages to the 
reputation of both investment bankers and the issuers. In other words, underpricing 
implicitly reduces the maximum dollar amount liability of possible lawsuits, since 
the damages are limited to the offer price.  
However, the lawsuit avoidance theory is criticised by other authors. Hughes 
and Thakor (1992) tested the pricing of IPOs in situations where there was a threat of 
a potential lawsuit, and found underpricing only in limited circumstances. Drake and 
Vetsuypens (1993) investigated 93 IPOs that involved lawsuits after each public 
offering took place and found that the sued firms had similar underpricing levels to 
those firms that did not subsequently get sued. This result of this and other studies 
suggest that lawsuits have little influence on the degree of IPO underpricing (see also 
Alexander, 1993). 
2.1.5 Tax motive theory 
Dandapani et al. (1992) suggest that there is a relationship between the 
amount of personal tax paid by entrepreneurs on an IPO and its level of underpricing. 
The presence of taxes reinforces underpricing in IPOs. There are two main 
assumptions within this theoretical model.  Firstly, an entrepreneur is a person who is 
responsible for setting the issue price of the shares and may retain some portion of 
ownership. Second, the purpose behind the IPO is to fund a project with a positive 
net present value (NPV). Normally, the value of a firm will increase when a new 
project with a positive NPV is undertaken. As a result, the entrepreneur might choose 
to withdraw this increase in corporate value in a form of a royalty or dividend. 
However, if the shares of an IPO are underpriced and the entrepreneur retains some 
portion of the shares, the entrepreneur can keep the gain in a form of unrealised 
capital gain. Since an unrealised gain is not immediately taxable, the entrepreneur 
may prefer to convert it to a realised taxable gain either in the form of a dividend or 
royalty, depending on the favourable tax rates payable by the entrepreneur. A 
variation of this theory was provided by Rydqvist (1997), who suggests that 
underpricing is likely to be influenced by the prevailing tax treatment of ordinary 
income versus capital gains. 
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2.1.6 Psychological bias theory 
In general, IPOs are most likely to be underpriced in order to provide 
investors with initial returns in excess of market norms. However, the long-term 
performance of IPOs is often inferior to the corresponding market-index benchmark 
of performance (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004). As a result, certain authors 
argue that underwriters actually set the offer price equal to the true value of the firm, 
but the initial excess return is influenced by an overreaction by irrational investors. 
For example, Daniel et al. (2002) utilise a psychological bias perspective to 
suggest that certain investors are overconfident about the correctness of their private 
information about an IPO. As a result, they trust their own private information rather 
than publicly available information or signals from the company itself. This 
behaviour leads to overestimation in the performance of IPOs and overreaction on 
the first trading day. Furthermore, investors tend to persistently ignore the 
subsequent public information about the IPO, making the overreaction in the share 
price persist longer. Similarly, Bloomfield et al. (2000) found that investors tend to 
overreact to unreliable information and underreact to reliable information. However, 
in the long-term, stock prices tend to reflect the correct value of the firm and the 
majority of IPOs provide poor long-term performance (Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan, 2004). 
2.1.7 Fads Theory 
Shiller et al. (1984) developed the “Fads” theory to suggest that investment is 
another activity where investors spend time discussing, reading, and gossiping about 
successful or failed investments. As a result, it is likely that investor behaviour may 
be influenced by social dynamics. This view is supported by a number of authors, 
and suggests that social movements, fashions, or fads are an important cause of 
speculation in asset price movements. 
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) tested the existence of “fads” within the market 
for IPOs by developed a model that provided two possible explanations for 
underpricing in IPOs.  The first explanation was that investment banks systematically 
underprice IPOs to be lower than their intrinsic value. The second explanation was 
that the stock prices of IPOs in early aftermarket trading are subject to overvaluation 
or fads. The results provided by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) suggest that investors 
made gains from early price appreciation and losses in subsequent price declines. 
These results challenge the efficient market hypothesis (Malkiel and Fama, 1970) 
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and demonstrate that stock markets might be inefficient (Summer, 1986), otherwise, 
the returns in early aftermarket should be close to index returns. Despite this 
supporting evidence, the theory of fads with the pricing of IPOs is questioned by 
many researchers such as Kleidon (1986), Marsh and Merton (1986), and Lee et al. 
(1996). 
 
2.2 Empirical evidence of short-term performance (underpricing) of IPOs 
The performance of IPOs has been widely investigated by many researchers 
since the 1970s. Underpricing of IPOs has been highlighted by researchers and the 
evidence gathered to support its existence is compelling. McDonald and Fisher 
(1972) examined the behaviour of 142 IPOs in the U.S. market (Dow Jones) during 
the period 1969-70 and found that on average the return on an IPO in the first week 
after trading was 28.5%. Ibbotson (1975) found an initial average return of 11.4% on 
IPOs offered during the 1960s, and Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) reported a 16.8% 
excess return on IPOs during their first month of trading when compared to the 
performance benchmark provided by Standard and Poor 500 Index. Finally, Ritter 
(1984), in an analysis of more than 5,000 IPOs during the period 1960-1982, found a 
positive yield that averaged 18.8%.  
Evidence of IPO underpricing has also been discovered in other established 
economies throughout the world. Jog and Ridiging (1987) and Kooli and Suret 
(2004) found underpricing of IPOs in the Canadian market. Ljungqvist (1997) 
discovered underpricing of IPOs in Germany. While in Asia, Dawson (1987) found 
IPO underpricing in three Asian stock markets; Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Malaysia. Mok and Hui (1998), Su and Fleisher (1999), and Chan et al. (2004) found 
evidence of IPO underpricing in China, and Perera and Kulendran (2012) discovered 
evidence of short-term underpricing in Australian IPOs. In the U.K., Boulton et al. 
(2011) recorded an average level of 17.7% underpricing in U.K IPOs completed 
during the period from 2000 to 2006. Additionally, Boulton et al. (2011) found that 
those countries whose public firms produce higher quality earning information tend 
to have lower levels of IPO underpricing. 
Although there is considerable evidence suggesting that IPOs on average are 
underpriced and therefore result in unusual initial returns mainly due to information 
asymmetry (Bernile et al. (2012), Nielsson and Wójcik (2016), Gounopoulos et al. 
(2017), Gounopoulos and Pham (2018)), a large proportion of IPOs experience an 
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eventual decline in price in the long-run. Instead of underpricing, Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004) argue that IPOs are actually overpriced, as they provide a high 
first-day return but then generate poor performance in the long-run. 
  
2.3 Long-term performance of IPOs 
Unlike the consistent outstanding first-day return, IPOs appear to provide 
poor levels of long-term performance. In the U.S., Ritter (1991) identifies that IPOs 
generally underperform the market or public companies with similar characteristics, 
such as size and industry.  To test the long-term performance of IPOs, Ritter (1991) 
analysed 1,500 IPOs during the period 1975 to 1984 by comparing their return with 
the return of benchmark companies. Ritter (1991) established that the IPOs 
significantly underperformed the benchmark by almost 30% after a 36 month period. 
Similarly, Ibbotson (1975) examined and computed the excess returns on IPOs for a 
10-year period from 1960 to 1969, and found that returns were no different from the 
market return. However, Ibbotson (1975) did find positive performance during the 
first year of IPO trading, negative performance during both the second to fourth 
years, and positive performance during the fifth year of trading. 
Generally IPOs in many world markets underperform in the long-term when 
compared to benchmarks such as the corresponding market index return or 
performance of comparable firms. For example, Lee et al. (1996) found poor long-
term performance amongst Australian IPOs. Ljungqvist (1997) found that after 3-
years German IPOs underperformed Germany’s broad market index by 12%. 
Jaskiewicz et al. (2005) examined IPOs in Spain during 1990-2000 and found that, 
on average, Spanish IPOs generated a 36.7% lower return than the market index.  
Although the long-term performance of IPOs may be affected by many 
factors, one important factor appears to be the reputation of the underwriting 
institution. Carter et al. (1998) suggest that IPO stocks handled by reputable 
underwriters tend to experience less severe underperformance relative to the market. 
Su and Bangassa (2011) also investigated the impact of underwriter reputation on the 
long-term performance of 590 Chinese IPOs during 2001-2008. They found that the 
long-term performance had a positive relationship with underwriter reputation. Their 
results suggest that IPOs issued by prestigious underwriters tend to perform better in 
the long-run than IPOs issued by general underwriters. Similarly, Dong et al. (2011) 
found that quality of the underwriter influences the long-term performance of IPOs. 
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IPO firms with higher quality underwriters significantly outperform IPO with lower 
quality underwriters. Finally, Ritter (1991) suggests that the long-term performance 
(underperformance) of IPOs may vary across industries. 
  
2.4 IPOs in Emerging Markets  
Emerging markets are becoming more important in terms of the global IPO 
market. Davies (2012) reports that even the London Stock Exchange, one of the most 
developed capital markets, is not one of the top five IPO markets in terms of total 
value of IPOs offered. Similarly, Chinese IPO markets, including mainland China, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan, dominated the global IPO market during the first 11 
months of deals during 2012.  
IPO markets in emerging economies appear to be significantly different from 
other, more established IPO markets. For example, Bekaert (1995) suggests that 
there are investment barriers associated with emerging equity markets in nineteen 
different countries. These emerging countries tend to have poor credit ratings, high 
and volatile levels of inflation, lack high-quality regulatory and accounting 
frameworks, and have limitations in terms of total market size.  
Even though the systematic risk of emerging markets differs from that 
exhibited by developed markets, IPO underpricing is still likely to be found 
(Loughran et al., 1994). An emerging market, however, may have specific 
characteristics, such as country risk, economic conditions, and regulations that may 
influence both the underpricing and long-term performance of IPOs. The next section 
of this paper briefly discusses the characteristics of the IPO markets in the Asian-
Pacific emerging markets of China, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
2.4.1 IPOs in China 
China has two main stock exchanges, Shanghai and Shenzhen, which operate 
separately and independently from each other. The Shanghai Stock Exchange was 
established in 1990 and in the following year Shenzhen was founded. Since then, 
Chinese stock markets have experienced rapid development and high growth rates. 
From 1992 to 2000, the number of companies listed on Chinese markets increased 
from 53 to 1,088 companies. Between 2007 and 2012, the Chinese economy grew by 
nearly 60 percent, and in 2000, Chinese stock markets (in aggregate) were ranked in 
10th place in terms of total worldwide market capitalization, and accounted for 1.81% 
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of the total global market capitalisation. In 2012, Chinese stock markets ranked in the 
2nd place and accounted for 6.95% of the world market capitalization. 
Since China is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, researchers 
have provided a wealth of information about Chinese stock markets including the 
domestic IPO market. Research focused on the short-term performance 
(underpricing) and long-term performance of IPOs in China during the period 1990-
1993. Mok and Hui (1998) found extreme underpricing of 289% in A-share IPOs 
while B-Share1 IPOs were underpriced by 26%. This high level of underpricing 
appears to be a feature of Chinese IPO markets, as Chan et al. (2004) also found A-
Share and B-Share underpricing of 178% and 11.6%, respectively in their study of 
IPOs issued in China during the period 1993-1998.  
Su and Fleisher (1998) suggest that the long time period between the date of 
the offer and the first trading day is linked to a degree in the underpricing in Chinese 
IPO markets. Su and Fleisher (1999) also suggest IPO in China may be the result of 
signalling, and that IPO firms in China may recoup the cost of underpricing from 
subsequent share issues. 
2.4.2 IPOs in South Korea 
South Korea has one security exchange located in Busan. The exchange is 
known as the Korea Exchange (KRX) and has integrated various types of trading 
such as stocks, bonds, futures, and other derivatives. There are three markets 
operating under the umbrella of the KRX. The Korea Composite Stock Price Index 
(KOSPI) is the main board listing medium to large capital stocks. The second market 
is the Korea Securities Dealers Association Automated Quotation (KOSDAQ) which 
is where small and medium companies with growth potential are listed. The third and 
final market is the Korea New Exchange (KONEX), which is relatively new, and 
provides finance for small business ventures looking to raise capital. Each market has 
its own specifications and requirements. For instance, the KOSPI and KOSDAQ are 
different in terms of the size of each company’s capital requirements but also in 
terms of their qualitative requirements, such as the listing requirements and fees. 
                                           
1
 "The two types of tradeable stocks on the two exchanges in China are personal ‘A’ shares and ‘B’ shares. The 
personal ‘A’ shares, issued by IPO and traded in domestic currency, are exclusively for domestic Chinese 
investors. The B shares, introduced in Shanghai in February 1992 and allocated primarily by private placements, 
are traded in US currency and are exclusively for foreign investors. These ‘B’ shares, designed to attract much-
needed foreign capital and to transform the management of the enterprises, are held mainly by foreign 
institutional investors. The A-and B-share markets are segmented given their ownership and 
institutional differences" (Mok and Hui, 1998). 
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Empirical evidence has shown that when firms go public, a significant degree 
of underpricing can be found in IPOs within many markets. The Korean IPO market 
is no exception, as during the period 2000-2007 the average initial return of IPOs 
was 57.6% which was considerably higher than the 25.7% achieved by IPOs in the 
U.S. market during the same period. Many researchers have attempted to explain the 
issue of underpricing within Korean markets since the early 1990s. Kim et al. (1993) 
explored the motives for going public and underpricing and identified that the motive 
behind the IPO issue was related to level of underpricing. These results suggest that 
when firms issue IPOs as their last resort of financing, the degree of underpricing is 
significantly higher than when firms use IPOs to diversify ownership. Furthermore, 
Kim et al. (1995) suggest that financial variables such as earning per share (EPS), 
offer size, type of industry, and offer type may also have a significant effect on IPO 
prices in South Korea. 
2.4.3 IPOs in Malaysia 
The exchange in Malaysia is known as the Bursa Malaysia, which provides a 
fully-integrated exchange which consists of several wholly-owned subsidiaries. Each 
subsidiary provides and operates exchange-related services for different type of 
financial securities (e.g. equities, bonds, derivatives). In Malaysia, there are two 
separate markets, the Main market and the ACE market. Generally, the Main market 
provides a platform for well-established companies to raise funds while the ACE 
market provides alternative source of funds for companies with growth potential. In 
2012, Bursa Malaysia was ranked 21st in terms of global market capitalisation with a 
total of 921 listed companies.   
The Malaysian IPO market has a unique way of defining an IPO issue. IPOs 
in Malaysia may refer to public offers by private sector companies or can be 
privatisation initial public offers (PIPOs) issued by state-owned companies (Yong 
and Isa, 2003). Malaysia has promoted privatisation since 1984.Researchers have 
found differences in the degree of underpricing between private sector IPOs and 
PIPOs in most markets. For instance, Menyah and Paudyal (1996) found that PIPOs 
in the UK market were on average underpriced by 38.7%, while IPOs were 
underpriced by only 3.48%. Paudyal et al. (1998) examined the Malaysian market 
during the period 1984-1995 and discovered similar patterns but with a higher 
magnitude of underpricing. IPOs in the Malaysian market had an average initial 
excess return of 52.5%, whereas the average achieved by PIPOs was 103.5%.  
13 
 
These results suggest that IPOs in emerging markets appear to have 
comparatively greater levels of underpricing than those offered in developed 
markets. However, the long-term performance of Malaysian IPOs appears to 
contradict the general findings from U.S. studies of IPOs, which suggest a poor long-
term performance in IPOs. For example, Jelic et al. (2001) examined IPOs in 
Malaysia during the period 1980-1995 and found positive levels of long-term 
performance in these IPOs for up to 3 years. 
2.4.4 IPOs in Thailand 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) is a juristic entity established in 1974 
and serves as a platform for the trading of listed securities. In 2012, SET had over 
600 companies listed with an aggregate market capitalization of $383 Billion, 
making it the 24th ranked global financial market. Thailand also has a Market for 
Alternative Investment (MAI) where small and medium size companies seeking 
funds are listed. In terms of prior work on the IPO market in Thailand, Chorruk and 
Worthington (2010) identified differences in the degree of underpricing in Thailand 
in the periods before and after the 1997 financial crisis. During the pre-crisis period 
1988-1989, underpricing was 56.73% (Wethayavivorn and Koo-Smith, 1991) and 
during 1985-1992 it was measured at 63.49% (Allen et al., 1999).  
Chorruk and Worthington (2010) examined the short-term performance of 
IPOs in Thailand in the period after the Asian financial crisis, and identified that the 
degree of underpricing in Thailand was significantly lower. Their results found that 
IPOs in Thailand are on average underpriced by only 17.6% which is lower than 
most developed markets. In contrast, the long-term performance of IPOs in Thailand 
appears to be poor. Chorruk and Worthington (2010) studied the cumulative monthly 
performances of Thai IPOs between their 1st and 36th month of trading. They found 
that after 24 months of outperforming the market, Thai IPOs underperformed the 
market. Vithessonthi (2008) provides additional evidence about this by suggesting 
that in the long-term Thai IPOs underperformed comparable firms by 41.68%, which 
is a substantially greater level of underperformance than IPOs in the developed 
markets. However, Allen et al. (1999) present contrasting evidence showing that the 
long-term performance of Thai IPOs outperformed the market returns by 10.02%. 
While the above work provides us with a good understanding of the IPO 
market in Thailand before the 2007 financial crisis, at the same time it appears 
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appropriate to develop Chorruk and Worthington’s (2010) work in order to 
investigate the impact of the 2007 financial crisis on the Thai IPO market. 
 
2.5 Summarizing the existing work on IPOs in emerging (Asian-Pacific) markets 
The literature review, on IPOs suggests underpricing (in the short-term) and 
poor long-term performance. Empirical evidence of IPO underpricing has been 
discovered in most countries where equity markets are available. However, there are 
differences in the extent of this underpricing, with differences between countries, 
industries, and or sectors. IPOs in emerging (Asian-Pacific) markets tend to provide 
investors with higher initial returns than IPOs issued in developed market. As a 
result, companies in emerging markets appear to bear a higher cost from issuing 
IPOs, and as a result, more money is expected to be left on the table.  There many 
reasons that may explain this underpricing, these include asymmetric information 
theory, agency theory, signalling theory and other similar theories. Despite this, the 
exact cause of underpricing is still intensely debated among researchers and there is 
no definitive conclusion on the matter. 
In terms of long-term performance of IPOs, the literature provides evidence 
that suggests that IPOs are most likely to perform poorly in the long-run. Yet, some 
outliers have been found in emerging markets, such as Korean IPOs and Thai IPOs, 
where long-term performance can outrun benchmarks. Some researchers suggest that 
the poor long-term performance is caused by investors being too optimistic about the 
potential growth of young firms (Ritter, 1991) or that IPOs may be overpriced from 
the very start (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004). 
 
3. Methodology 
The section explains the methodology used to evaluate the short-term and 
long-term stock price performance of IPOs in Thailand, China, South Korea and 
Malaysia during the period before and after the 2007 financial crisis. 
3.1 Data 
IPO data are extracted from Bloomberg for a period of 10 years starting from 
1st of January 2003 to 31st December 20122. The sample was divided into two sub-
periods which are 5 years (1st January 2003 – 31st December 2007) before and 5 
                                           
2
 The sample period 2003-2012 is chosen due to data constraints i.e. the investigation of the long-term IPO 
performance requires stock market data up to 36 months after the IPO announcement. 
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years (1st January 2008 – 31st December 2012) after the global financial crisis3. The 
total number of useable observations for Thailand, China, South Korea and Malaysia 
are 220, 1,299, 643, and 332, respectively. In addition, the Bloomberg database is 
used to provide the daily and monthly historical closing prices of IPO firms and the 
relevant market index for each country. 
  
3.2 Research method 
McWilliams and Seigel (1997) and MacKinlay (1997) indicate that an event 
study is the appropriate mean to assess the impact of an unexpected event. 
Furthermore, McWilliams and Seigel (1997) suggest that this research approach can 
also be used to determine whether there is an abnormal stock price effect connected 
with this unanticipated event. In addition to these strengths of an event study 
methodology, it also avoids the need to utilise accounting-based measures of profit, 
which may be manipulated by insiders.  
As a result, an event study methodology appears to be a suitable choice of 
method for investigating the impact of the 2007 global financial crisis on the short-
term and long-term performance of IPOs. However, there are crucial assumptions 
associated with the event study approach. These include the following assumptions: 
(1) markets are efficient, (2) the event is not anticipated, and (3) there were no 
confounding effects during the event window.  
The primary task for conducting an event study is to define the period in 
which the impact of the event is going to be measured. In this study, the event 
windows used to measure the short-term and long-term performance of IPOs are 1 
day and 36 months, respectively. 
 
3.3 The measurement of short-term performance and underpricing 
According to Rosa et al. (2003) and Chi and Padgett (2005), the short-term 
performance of IPOs can be measured using the percentage increase of the closing 
price on the first trading day over the original issue price:                                                 𝑅𝑖1   =   ( 𝑃𝑐,𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒) − 1,                      (1) 
                                           
3
 We divided the sample period into two sub-periods because we aim to capture the impact of financial crisis on 
the IPO performance therefore we document the IPO performance before and after the 2007 financial crisis and 
aim to identify whether this performance is significant different between the two sub-periods. 
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where 𝑃𝑐,𝑖 is the closing price on the first trading day of an 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖  and 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 is the 
issue price of 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖. The corresponding benchmark of each country is its stock market 
index. The return on the market index in a corresponding period is:                                                 𝑅𝑚1 = ( 𝑃𝑚1𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒) − 1,                     (2) 
where 𝑅𝑚1is the first day’s comparable market return, 𝑃𝑚1is the closing market index 
value on the first trading day and 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒  is the closing market index value on the 
offering day of the corresponding stock. 
The market-adjusted abnormal return for 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 can be calculated by using the 
two returns calculated in equation (1) and (2) as follows:                                               𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖1 = 𝑅𝑖1 − 𝑅𝑚1.                              (3) 
The sample mean of market-adjusted abnormal return for the first day of trading can 
be calculated as: 
                  𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑅1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 1𝑛 ∑ 𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖1𝑛𝑖=1 .                              (4) 
To test whether the mean of market-adjusted return is significantly different from 
zero, standardised t-statistic is computed as: 
                                         𝑡𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑅 =  𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑅1𝑆/√𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅,                                                    (5) 
where 𝑆 is the sample standard deviation of abnormal returns (𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖1) and 𝑛 is the 
number of sample IPOs. Additionally, another measurement tool applied is the 
wealth relative, WR1, which can be calculated as: 
                                         WR1 = 1+1𝑛 ∑ 𝑅𝑖1𝑛𝑖=11+1𝑛 ∑ 𝑅𝑚1𝑛𝑚=1 .                                        (6) 
According to Ritter (1991), a wealth relative of greater than 1.00 indicates that 
IPOs outperform the market in the corresponding period. A wealth relative of less 
than 1.00 indicates that IPOs underperform the market. 
 
3.4 The measurement of long-term performance – the aftermarket performance 
Cumulative abnormal return (CARs) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were first used by Ritter (1991) to 
measure the long-term performance of IPOs. In order to calculate CARs, first the raw 
return of the 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 for the event month 𝑡 is computed as:                                                𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ( 𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) − 1,                                                     (7) 
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where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly raw return of the 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 in the event month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the 
closing price at the end of month t of the 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the closing  price of the 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 
at the end of month t-14. Second, the same mathematical rational is applied to 
calculate the benchmark return for the 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 as follows:                                                   𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = ( 𝑃𝑚,𝑡𝑃𝑚.𝑡−1) − 1,                                                  (8) 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the monthly benchmark return of the 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 in the event month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑚,𝑡 is 
the closing price of the benchmark at the end of month t of the 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖, 𝑃𝑚,𝑡−1 is the 
closing price of the benchmark at the end of month t-1.  
Third, the benchmark (market) adjusted abnormal returns 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are computed 
by taking the difference of the raw return 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 of the 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 and the benchmark return 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 over the corresponding period (event month t).                                                 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡.                                                   (9) 
Fourth, the average abnormal benchmark-adjusted return of the portfolio with 𝑛 IPOs 
for the event month t is calculated as follows: 
                                    𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 1𝑛 ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 .                      𝑛𝑖=1                                      (10) 
Fifth, in order to measure the cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns for the 
long-term performance from event month 1 to month 𝑡, the following calculation is 
applied: 
                                  𝐶𝐴𝑅1,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = ∑  𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑡𝑡=1  .                                                  (11) 
Finally, the standardised t-statistic is computed to assess whether the cumulative 
average benchmark-adjusted returns is significantly different from zero.  
                                   𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅 =  𝐶𝐴𝑅1,𝑡𝑆/√𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ .                                                (12) 
The above measurements of long-term performance of IPOs are widely accepted in 
the literature; e.g. Ritter (1991), Brav and Gromper (1997) and Kim (1995). 
 
3.5 Performance benchmarks 
As discussed earlier, three of the Asian-Pacific emerging markets, under 
consideration, have more than one stock exchange (e.g. Thailand, China, and South 
                                           
4 
 We investigate the long term performance post the listing month, so the 12, 24 and 36 months long term IPO 
returns do not include the listing month return. I.e., we exclude the impact of short term underpricing in the 
measurement of the long term IPO performance. 
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Korea). As the IPOs in these countries may be issued on different stock markets, the 
corresponding benchmark(s) of each IPOs is(are) explained as follows.  
For Thailand, two benchmarks are applied in the above calculations. The 
Stock Exchange of Thailand Index is the benchmark for IPOs issued in SET market. 
The Market for Alternative Investment Index is the benchmark for its corresponding 
IPOs. For China, the benchmarks utilised are the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Composite Index and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Index. For South Korea, 
the Korea Composite Stock Price Index and Korean Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations Index are selected as the benchmarks. For Malaysia, the Kuala Lumpur 
Composite Index is the benchmark against IPOs issued in the Bursa Malaysia stock 
market. 
The underpricing of each IPO is tested against the market index return of the 
same period to eliminate the confounding effect. The t-test is then used to confirm 
whether the underpricing is significantly different from zero. In the long-term, the 
performance of IPOs is accessed by using the cumulative average returns which have 
been adjusted by the market index returns. 
  
4. Results 
This section presents the results of the research study for the IPOs in 
Thailand, China, South Korea, and Malaysia. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Each set of descriptive statistics are presented in a tabular, panel data format, 
with Thailand, China, South Korea, and Malaysia being allocated to panels A, B, C 
and D, respectively.  For the purposes of this event study, each country’s  sample of 
IPOs were allocated into either a pre-crisis or a post-crisis time-period covering the 
years 2003-2007 and 2008-2012, respectively. 
4.1.1 Analysis of IPOs in Thailand 
Panel A of Table 1 illustrates that a greater number of IPOs were issued in 
Thailand before the financial crisis. The 153 IPOs issued during 2003-2007 were 
primarily made up of IPOs from the industrial, consumer cyclical, financial, and 
basic material sectors. However, during the post-crisis period the number of IPOs 
declined substantially, with the consumer cyclical and industrial sectors leading the 
way. In the post-crisis period, Thailand’s 5-year average GDP growth rate decreased 
from 5.6% to 2.9% after 2007. In addition, market risk and uncertainty were further 
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increased as a result of political unrest that occurred in the country during 2007. 
Under this context, the reduction in the total number of Thai IPOs is relatively easy 
to explain. Similarly, Chorruk and Worthington (2010) found evidence of fewer IPOs 
being issued after the 1997 financial crisis. In the period of uncertainty after the 
financial crisis, Thai firms were less confident in their ability to undertake a 
successful IPO. Going public incurs a large amount of direct (e.g. underwriter fees) 
and indirect costs (e.g. underpricing cost). If market and economic risk increases, 
rational investors will require higher compensation, making it even more costly for 
firms who decide to go public. 
(INSERT PANEL A OF TABLE 1 HERE)  
(INSERT PANEL A OF TABLE 2 HERE) 
Panel A of Table 2 illustrates that before the financial crisis the 70% of IPOs 
were issued by the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), which is where companies 
with medium to large market capital needs raise their funds. However, in the post-
crisis period most IPOs were issued through the Market for Alternative Investment 
(MAI). Considering the differences of both exchanges, SET provides a platform for 
medium to large capitalisation enterprises, while MAI is suitable for small and 
medium size enterprises (SME). Firms listed on the SET exchange are generally 
more mature in their development, while the SMEs listed on the MAI exchange are 
firms seeking funds for growth. 
4.1.2 Analysis of IPOs in China 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that, in general, the number of IPOs issued in China 
increased substantially in the post-crisis period. A key factor behind this substantial 
increase in the number of Chinese IPOs during this period was the country’s high 
rate of economic growth. For example, Chinese GDP increased by an annual rate of 
9.6% and 10.4% in the years 2008 and 2010, respectively.  
(INSERT PANEL B OF TABLE 1 HERE)  
Another factor was that in 2007 the Chinese government introduced a new 
regulation that required local companies that were listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange to return to an exchange in mainland. The top three industry sectors in 
China before the crisis were industrial, consumer-cyclical, and consumer-non-
cyclical (30%, 16%, and 16%, respectively). After the crisis, there was no change in 
the top three positions, with the industrial sector expanding its share of the Chinese 
IPO market. 
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(INSERT PANEL B OF TABLE 2 HERE) 
Panel B of Table 2 illustrates the number of IPOs issued on Chinese markets 
during the periods 2003-2007 and 2008-2012. While the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
experienced a decrease in the total number of IPOs being placed, the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange experienced a considerable increase in IPO activity during the post-crisis 
period. In general, large market-capitalization companies are listed in Shanghai, 
whereas small and medium-capitalization companies are listed in Shenzhen. 
4.1.3 Analysis of IPOs in South Korea 
Panel C of Table 1 illustrates that the Korean IPO market was dominated by 
industrial and technology companies during the period 2003-2007. After 2007, the 
industrial sector still dominated IPO activity with a 31% market share followed by 
the technology sector with a 19% share of total IPOs. It appears that the financial 
crisis did not adversely affect the total number of IPOs coming to market in South 
Korea. The industrial and technology sectors in South Korea continued to perform 
well in the post-crisis period. In addition, South Korean companies managed to 
expand their exports to emerging markets, and Korea’s GDP was supported by a 
recovery in domestic demand (Leon-Manriquez, 2010). A key element in South 
Korea’s rapid recovery from the financial crisis was the diversification within its 
export destinations.  
(INSERT PANEL C OF TABLE 1 HERE) 
(INSERT PANEL C OF TABLE 2 HERE) 
Panel C of Table 2 indicates that the total number of IPOs being issued in 
South Korea was relatively unaffected by the financial crisis. Both of the exchanges 
in South Korea experienced only a slight decrease in the number of IPOs during the 
post-crisis period. The number of IPOs occurring on the KOSDAQ market is higher 
because this exchange is preferred by the vast majority of small and medium sized 
companies seeking to go public. 
4.1.4 Analysis of IPOs in Malaysia 
Panel D of Table 1 illustrates that the total number of IPOs on the Malaysian 
market was adversely affected by the financial crisis, as the total number declined by 
57% between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. After the financial crisis, the 
Malaysian economy experienced a significant downturn i.e. 1.5% contraction in GDP 
during 2009. As investor sentiment is one of the most important factors affecting a 
company’s decision to go public (Lowry, 2003), it is no surprise that the downturn in 
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the Malaysian economy delayed the IPOs of many private companies. Before the 
crisis, the main contributors of the Malaysian IPO market were industrial, consumer-
cyclical, and technology sectors. After the crisis, the industrial sector still held a 27% 
market share, although the total number of IPOs in all sectors declined, apart from 
Energy.   
(INSERT PANEL D OF TABLE 1 HERE) 
Overall, the aforementioned tables of national IPO activity in the pre-crisis 
and post-crisis periods provide a record of how the financial crisis affected the total 
number of companies going public in each of the four Asian-Pacific countries. While 
the impact varied by country, the financial crisis reduced IPO activity in all countries 
apart from China. China was an exceptional as IPO activity during the period was 
supported by strong economic growth and a change in Chinese stock market 
regulations.  Nonetheless, a common trend across the four countries is that IPOs were 
more frequently issued by companies from the industrial sectors of each economy. 
 
4.2 Short-term Performance (Underpricing) 
Previous research on IPOs suggests that most public offerings are likely to be 
under-priced, and as a result, IPOs tend to generate significant positive returns during 
the first trading day (Ibbotson, 1975, and Ritter, 1984). Next, this paper explores 
whether the level of IPO underpricing in Thailand, China, South Korea and Malaysia 
was affected by the global financial crisis. 
4.2.1 Underpricing in Thailand 
Panel A of Table 3 demonstrates that the average degree of IPO underpricing 
in Thailand during the pre-crisis 2003-2007 period was 19%, which is significant at 
1% level. This result is in line with previous research conducted by Chorruk and 
Worthington (2010) that examined the Thai market during 1997-2007 and found an 
average degree of underpricing of 17.6%. Surprisingly, the average underpricing 
substantially increased to 44% after the crisis, which is also significant at 1% level. 
However, given the significant drop in IPO activity in Thai market post the 2007 
financial crisis (see Table 1, Panel A) issuing Thai firms left on the table less US$ 
than the pre-crisis period (US$ 0.1 and 0.34 billion in the post-crisis and pre-crisis 
five years period, respectively). Ritter (1984) mentions that riskier IPOs are likely to 
be more underpriced than less risky IPOs. According to asymmetric information 
theory, the uncertainty about the IPOs price is positively related to the degree of 
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underpricing (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Not only the risk of economic downturn but 
also the political risk in Thailand had added more uncertainty to the Thai stock 
market. Thai political crisis has evolved since 2006 and got worsen in 2008 when the 
protestors decided to siege the international airport of Thailand. The changes of risk 
composition after the crisis push the IPO firms to provide more incentive for 
investors to invest in their firms in the time of high uncertainty.  
(INSERT PANEL A OF TABLE 3 HERE) 
Furthermore, the average level of IPO underpricing before and after the crisis 
in Thailand are significantly different from one another, at 1% level of significance. 
These results confirm that after the financial crisis in 2007, the underpricing of Thai 
IPOs significantly increased5. In general, Thai IPOs are more likely to be 
underpriced with a higher magnitude of underpricing after the crisis due to both 
external (the world economy slow down) and internal risk factors (the political 
unrest). 
4.2.2 Underpricing in China 
In contrast to the situation in Thailand, the magnitude of Chinese IPO 
underpricing declined dramatically after the financial crisis. This change in 
underpricing of Chinese IPOs is represented by the decline in the mean value of 
market-adjusted returns (MAAR) in Panel B of Table 3. Underpricing in China 
decreased significantly from 114.1% in the pre-crisis period to only 41.5% after the 
crisis. The t-statistics suggests that both mean values are significantly positive at the 
1% level. Also, the t-statistic of the difference of the two sample means confirms that 
the two means are statistically different from each other. 
(INSERT PANEL B OF TABLE 3 HERE) 
The pre-crisis results of this study are in line with the results of previous 
studies of the Chinese IPO market. Chi and Padgett (2005) found a market-adjusted 
return during 1996-2000 of 129%. Even though the severity of underpricing 
decreased in the post-crisis period (41.5% from 114.1%), it is still relatively high 
when compared to the underpricing present within most developed IPO markets. 
Given the significant increase in IPO activity in the Chinese market in the post-crisis 
period (see Table 1, Panel B), issuing Chinese firms left US$ 70 billion on the table 
                                           
5
 However, the average market-adjusted return of 44% during 2008-2012 are in contrast to Chorruk and 
Worthington (2010) who suggests that IPOs in Thailand tend to be less under-priced than those of developed 
countries i.e. Loughran et al. (1994) documented average degrees of underpricing in the U.S., the U.K, and 
Germany of 16.8%, 16.1% and 24.2%, respectively. 
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in the post-crisis period, an amount that far exceeded the total value left on the table 
during the pre-crisis period (US$ 23 billion). The high level of IPO underpricing in 
China may be partly explained by the characteristics of Chinese stock market. Most 
Chinese investors are individual investors, who tend to lack investment knowledge 
and invest to earn speculative returns (Xia et al., 2013). In addition while the demand 
for IPOs in China is high, the number of new shares available to investors is limited, 
due to the high proportion of shares held by governmental bodies. As a result, as 
Chinese investors attempt to buy shares of new IPO firms on the first trading day, the 
overall level of underpricing is increased.  
In an effort to alleviate such structural market problems, during 2005 the 
Chinese government announced stock market reforms aimed to reduce the proportion 
of shares held by governmental bodies. This reform increased the availability of 
shares in certain Chinese IPOs, thereby reducing the overall level of underpricing in 
the Chinese stock markets. 
4.2.3 Underpricing in South Korea 
Panel C of Table 3 suggests that similarly to the Chinese Market, 
underpricing of South Korean IPOs declined in the post-crisis period. The average 
market-adjusted return decreased from 43.7% to 27.9%, at 1% level of significance. 
In addition, the t-test of the difference of the two-mean values was 4.48 indicating 
that the level of underpricing in the post-crisis period was significantly lower than in 
the pre-crisis period. In summary, IPOs in South Korea were generally underpriced 
in both time periods, although the amount left on the table increased from US$ 40 
and 64 billion during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, respectively. 
(INSERT PANEL C OF TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
4.2.4 Underpricing in Malaysia 
Panel D of Table 3 illustrates the level of IPO underpricing in Malaysia. 
During 2003-2007, Malaysian IPOs were underpriced by an average of 30.1%, at 1% 
level of significance. While these results are not in line with the earlier findings of 
Paudyal et al. (1998) who found average underpricing of 61.8% during 1984-1995, 
they support the theoretical predictions that the privatisation of enterprises owned by 
the Malaysian state may contribute to the high level of IPO underpricing in the 
Malaysian market. 
(INSERT PANEL D OF TABLE 3 HERE) 
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In the post-crisis period, Malaysian IPOs experienced similar trend in 
underpricing as those reported in China and South Korea. The average initial excess 
return of Malaysian IPOs decreased from 30.1% to 11.3%, suggesting that 
underpricing was significantly lower (at the 1% level) in the post-crisis period6
.
  
Overall, as a consequence of IPO underpricing in the Malaysian market during 2003-
2012, issuing Malaysian firms left US$ 2.3 billion on the table. The overall results of 
our underpricing analysis in each of the four Asian-Pacific emerging markets 
supports the theoretical expectation of significant IPO underpricing in emerging 
markets during both the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Furthermore, it is 
commonly found that the level of IPO underpricing in the pre-crisis period differed 
from the post-crisis period which suggests that the financial crisis affected the 
pricing behaviour of IPOs in each country. However, it is important to note that the 
Thai IPO market showed an opposite trend to the other three countries. Thailand 
exhibited higher levels of underpricing because of severe political instability, while 
the other three countries faced lower underpricing due to reforms which reduced 
uncertainty. For example, IPO underpricing in China was influenced by regulatory 
reforms. However, the level of underpricing in each of the four emerging markets 
studied is relatively high when compared to the results of studies on IPOs in 
developed countries. The economic significance of the high level of IPO 
underpricing in the emerging markets of the Asian-Pacific region (given the high 
IPO activity) is evidenced by the fact that during 2003-2012 (before and after the 
financial crisis), issuing firms in the four Asian-Pacific emerging markets left more 
than US$ 200 billion on the table. The level of underpricing in these four Asian-
Pacific emerging markets became more evident in the post-crisis period, given the 
increase of IPO activity in this period. In particular, issuing firms in these four 
Asian-Pacific emerging markets left on the table US$ 64 and 136 billion in the pre-
crisis and post-crisis five years period, respectively, which may affect negative the 
potentials for economic growth in the region. Although the results of short-term 
performance analysis provide valuable evidence about the extent of IPO underpricing 
in each country, it does not fully explain the overall performance of IPOs. As a 
                                           
6 
 Demand for IPOs had dropped in Malaysia due to Global financial crisis (see Panel D of Table 1), which can be 
detected from the lower over-subscription ratio. The over-subscription ratio is partly related to the degree of 
underpricing. Lower over-subscription ratio usually results in lower initial return.  
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result, next section analyses the long-term performance of IPOs in each of the four 
Asian-Pacific emerging markets in both the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
 
4.3 Analysis of Long-term performance in emerging IPO markets 
Although the majority of prior studies provide evidence of widespread 
underpricing of IPOs, critics of such work argue that IPOs may not really be 
underpriced. For example, investment banks may correctly price an IPO but the offer 
price could be influenced by “noisy investors” who are overconfident (optimistic) 
about the potential growth of IPO companies (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 
2004). Indeed, prior research suggests that IPO companies generally generate poor 
long-term returns for investors. However, this may not be the case for IPOs in 
emerging markets, as empirical evidence suggests that emerging markets provide 
outstanding long-term performance (Kim et al., 1995, Jelic et al., 2001) due to 
government intervention and rapid economic growth. 
In order to extend our existing knowledge of long-term performance of IPOs 
in emerging markets, this section analyses the long-term performance of IPOs in the 
Asian-Pacific emerging markets of Thailand, China, South Korea, and Malaysia 
during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
4.3.1 Long-term performance of IPOs in Thailand 
Panel A of Table 4 summarises the long-term performance of Thai IPOs. 
CARs are calculated on a monthly basis from month 1 to 36. The results indicate that 
the long-term performance of Thai IPOs appear to outperform the market index. 
During 2003-2007, the 36 month CAR is 7.5%, at a 1% level of significance. The 36 
month CAR achieved in the post-crisis period was 43.1%, significantly higher than 
that achieved in the pre-crisis period, at a 1% level of significance (t-statistic is 3.03). 
(INSERT PANEL A OF TABLE 4 HERE) 
(INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE) 
Figure 1 illustrates the CAR results for Thai IPOs. Before the crisis, the CAR 
reached zero in month 16 and was negative up to month 27. This poor long-term 
performance is similar to that found by Chorruk and Worthington (2010), who 
identified that the CAR of Thai IPOs declined to zero during month 24. Results of 
the post-crisis period are in contrast with the traditional pattern, as CAR remained 
positive from month 1 to 36. The bullish trend in Thai stock market in the post-crisis 
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period may be one of the factors that influence the long-term performance of IPOs to 
beat the benchmark. 
4.3.2 Long-term performance of IPOs in China 
CARs over the 36 months period shown in Panel B of Table 4 illustrate that 
Chinese IPOs outperformed the market during both 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 
periods, 5% and 25%, respectively. In addition, it is evident that IPO CARs for the 
36 months post-crisis period are significantly higher than those of the pre-crisis 
period, at 1% level (t-statistic is 3.31). 
(INSERT PANEL B OF TABLE 4 HERE) 
(INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE) 
Chen et al. (2011) investigated IPO CARs in China over the period 1996 to  
2005 and found that CARs over 24 and 36 months period are 2.4% and -0.1%, 
respectively. They suggest that the long-term IPO CAR is not likely to outperform 
the market. Similarly, Figure 2, which provides a detailed picture of the Chinese 
IPOs performance in the pre and post-crisis period, illustrates that the CARs of 
Chinese IPOs during most of the pre-crisis period underperformed the market. On the 
contrary the CARs of the post-crisis period appear to over perform the market 
especially after the 24 months post-IPO period. 
4.3.3 Long-term performance of IPOs in South Korea 
Panel C of Table 4 documents the long-term performance of South Korean 
IPOs. The long-term performance results for South Korean IPOs are interesting as 
they differ from the results obtained from the other emerging markets under 
investigation.  In particular CARs over the 36 months period during the pre-crisis 
and post-crisis periods are both significantly positive, 18.9% and 50.5%, 
respectively, at 1% level of significance. These findings are in line with the earlier 
work of Kim et al. (1995), who found that Korean IPOs were likely to generate 
outstanding long-term performance. 
(INSERT PANEL C OF TABLE 4 HERE) 
(INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE) 
Figure 3 illustrates that Korean IPOs are likely to outperform the market in 
the long-term. However, the t-test for the difference of the two sample mean values 
(see Panel C of Table 4) suggests that there is a significantly statistical difference 
(only at 10% level) between the CARs before and after the financial crisis. A 
possible explanation for the increased (post-crisis) long-term performance of Korean 
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IPOs is that their returns were influenced by the improved performance of the 
Korean Stock Market, whose index increased from 1,100 to 2,000 points during the 
period 2009-2012.  
4.3.4 Long-term performance of IPOs in Malaysia 
Malaysia is the only country where long-term IPO performance resulted in 
high negative returns. Panel D of Table 4 illustrates that IPO CARs over the 36 
month period were -25.8% and -30.9% in the pre-crisis and post crisis periods, 
respectively. Previous research on the Malaysian IPO market suggests that Malaysian 
IPOs did not out-perform or under-perform the market (Paudyal et al., 1998).On the 
other hand, Jelic et al. (2001) suggest that Malaysian IPOs tend to outperform the 
market in the long-term. The results of the present study appear to differ due to the 
calendar period being analysed and the methodology used. For example, Paudyal et 
al. (1998) applied daily market-adjusted compounded returns. 
(INSERT PANEL D OF TABLE 4 HERE) 
Figure 4 provides clear evidence that Malaysian IPOs underperformed the 
market in both periods.  
(INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE) 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigated the effects of the 2007 global financial crisis on the 
relative short-term and long-term performance of IPOs in the Asian-Pacific emerging 
markets of Thailand, China, South Korea, and Malaysia. The results of this study 
suggest that the short and long-term performance of IPOs in each of the four 
emerging markets were significantly affected by the 2007 financial crisis. However, 
the extent of this impact was inconsistent across the four markets.   
While IPO underpricing increased in Thailand partly as a result of increased 
political uncertainty, the level of underpricing actually decreased in China, South 
Korea, and Malaysia. Between the pre-crisis and post crisis periods, IPO 
underpricing in Thailand increased from 19% to 44%. In contrast, underpricing in 
Chinese, South Korean and Malaysian IPO markets declined from 114% to 41.5%, 
43.7% to 27.9%, and 30.1% to 11.3%, respectively. Even though underpricing in 
emerging markets has been reduced due to regulatory reforms (Ekkayokkaya and 
Pengniti, 2012, Chang et al., 2012), it is still high compared to developed markets. 
This may be due to government ownership (Liao and Young, 2012), owner 
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dispersion (Hussin, 2005), and ex-ante uncertainty (Su and Fleisher, 1998, Chen et 
al., 2004).  
In terms of the long-term performance of IPOs in the post-crisis period, IPOs 
in Thailand, China, and South Korea all outperformed the benchmark in the 36 
month period after each IPOs was placed. In contrast, the long-term performance of 
Malaysian IPOs was poor. During the post-crisis period of 2008-2012, IPOs in South 
Korea generated the highest performance with a CAR of 50.5% during the 36 months 
period after IPO placement. The post-crisis long-term CAR performance results for 
Thailand, China and Malaysia were 43.1%, 25% and -30.9%, respectively.  
The long-term performance results for each of the four emerging markets are 
interesting, as they also contradict the results and observations from IPOs studies in 
developed markets. While, most IPOs in developed markets appear to underperform 
the market in the long-term, the results of this study suggest that IPOs in emerging 
markets outperformed the market in the long-run, especially in the post-crisis period.  
The policy implications of this study are very important for financial 
regulators and corporations (firms) seeking for new sources of finance through 
capital markets. More specifically, the economic significance of the high level of 
IPO underpricing in the Asian-Pacific emerging markets during 2003-2012 period 
(before and after the financial crisis) is evident by the US$ 200 billion left on the 
table by issuing firms. Given the increase of IPO activity in the Asian-Pacific 
emerging markets in the post-crisis period, the significance of the economic 
implications of IPO underpricing in the emerging markets (in the Asian-pacific 
region) becomes more evident. In particular, issuing firms in these four Asian-Pacific 
emerging markets left on the table US$ 64 and 136 billion in the pre-crisis and post-
crisis five years period, respectively, which may affect negative the potentials for 
economic growth in the region.  
In this research study the analysis of the IPO performance is limited only to 
four (emerging) countries. In addition, the research on the IPO performance is 
conducted separately for each country to provide more specific information for each 
country’s IPO performance. Future research on the IPO performance of the Asian-
pacific emerging markets may be conducted on a pooled basis.  
The inconsistency in the comparative short and long-term performance of 
IPOs in emerging and developed markets is a potential area for future research. In 
addition, it would be interesting to investigate the specific factors that affect IPO 
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performance in emerging markets. For instance, Warther (1995) found a high 
correlation between security returns and fund flows, and Richards (2005) 
investigated the impact of foreign investors in emerging markets. As a result, the 
2007 financial crisis may have diverted international capital flows towards emerging 
markets, thereby increasing overall IPO performance in these regions. 
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Figures & Tables 
Table 1: Numbers of IPOs by Industry 
Panel A Thailand 
 
Panel B China 
 
  
Basic Materials 22 14% 9 13% 31 14%
Communications 11 7% 7 10% 18 8%
Consumer, Cyclical 27 18% 18 27% 45 20%
Consumer, Non-cyclical 13 8% 9 13% 22 10%
Energy 5 3% 1 1% 6 3%
Financial 22 14% 5 7% 27 12%
Industrial 45 29% 14 21% 59 27%
Technology 7 5% 1 1% 8 4%
Utilities 1 1% 3 4% 4 2%
Total 153 67 220
Industry Sector
'03-07 '08-12
Numbers of IPOs
Total
Basic Materials 53 15% 99 10% 152 12%
Communications 12 3% 49 5% 61 5%
Consumer, Cyclical 57 16% 125 13% 182 14%
Consumer, Non-cyclical 55 16% 142 15% 197 15%
Energy 10 3% 22 2% 32 2%
Financial 18 5% 17 2% 35 3%
Industrial 107 30% 403 43% 510 39%
Technology 30 9% 81 9% 111 9%
Utilities 9 3% 10 1% 19 1%
Total 351 948 1,299
Industry Sector Numbers of IPOs
'03-07 '08-12 Total
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Panel C South Korea 
 
Panel D Malaysia 
 
  
Basic Materials 17 5% 19 6% 36 6%
Communications 45 14% 35 11% 80 12%
Consumer, Cyclical 41 12% 35 11% 76 12%
Consumer, Non-cyclical 37 11% 33 11% 70 11%
Energy 1 0% 4 1% 5 1%
Financial 42 13% 25 8% 67 10%
Industrial 95 29% 97 31% 192 30%
Technology 52 16% 59 19% 111 17%
Utilities 1 0% 5 2% 6 1%
Total 331 312 643
Industry Sector Numbers of IPOs
'03-07 '08-12 Total
Basic Materials 20 9% 9 9% 29 9%
Communications 19 8% 7 7% 26 8%
Consumer, Cyclical 18 8% 15 15% 33 10%
Consumer, Non-cyclical 40 17% 17 17% 57 17%
Energy 7 3% 9 9% 16 5%
Financial 16 7% 7 7% 23 7%
Industrial 75 32% 27 27% 102 31%
Technology 37 16% 9 9% 46 14%
Utilities 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Total 232 100 332
Industry Sector Numbers of IPOs
'03-07 '08-12 Total
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Table 2: Numbers of IPOs by Exchange Market 
Panel A Thailand 
 
Panel B China 
 
Panel C South Korea 
 
  
Stock Exchange of Thailand 107 70% 29 43% 136 62%
Market for Alternative Investment 46 30% 38 57% 84 38%
Total 153 67 220
Exchange Market Numbers of IPOs
'03-07 '08-12 Total
Shanghai Stock Exchange 148 42% 97 10% 245 19%
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 203 58% 851 90% 1,054 81%
Total 351 948 1,299
Exchange Market Numbers of IPOs
'03-07 '08-12 Total
Korea Stock Exchange 81 24% 74 24% 155 24%
KOSDAQ Exchange 250 76% 238 76% 488 76%
Total 331 312 643
Exchange Market Numbers of IPOs
'03-07 '08-12 Total
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Table 3: Market-adjusted short-term returns of IPOs  
 
Panel A Thailand 
 2003-2007 2008-2012 2003-2012 
Mean 0.190*** 0.440*** 0.266*** 
t-statistic 6.611 6.365 8.884 
Wealth Relative 1.190 1.439 1.266 
Observations 53 67 220 
t-statistic  of the difference of the two sample mean market adjusted returns  is -
3.956*** 
Panel B China 
 2003-2007 2008-2012 2003-2012 
Mean 1.141*** 0.415*** 0.611*** 
t-statistic 22.059 25.350 29.913 
Wealth Relative 2.140 1.416 1.612 
Observations 351 948 1299 
t-statistic  of the difference of the two sample mean market adjusted returns  is 
17.521*** 
Panel C South Korea 
 2003-2007 2008-2012 2003-2012 
Mean 0.437*** 0.279*** 0.360*** 
t-statistic 17.054 11.466 20.062 
Wealth Relative 1.437 1.278 1.360 
Observations 331 312 643 
t-statistic  of the difference of the two sample mean market adjusted returns  is 
4.477*** 
Panel D Malaysia 
 2003-2007 2008-2012 2003-2012 
Mean 0.301*** 0.113*** 0.244*** 
t-statistic 9.321 2.211 8.834 
Wealth Relative 1.301 1.113 1.245 
Observations 232 100 332 
t-statistic  of the difference of the two sample mean market adjusted returns  is 
4.323*** 
Notes: Notes: the short-term performance of IPOs is measured using the percentage change of the closing price 
on the first trading day over the original issue price adjusted by the market return over the same period. 
 *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns (CAR) for the pre-
crisis period (2003-2007) and post-crisis period (2008-2013)   
 
Panel A  Thailand 
Month 
2003-2007 2008-2012 
CAR StdDev t-stat Size CAR StdDev t-stat Size 
12  0.031*** 0.128  2.985 152  0.194*** 0.142 9.578 49 
24 -0.046*** 0.130 -4.313 150  0.317*** 0.101 19.586 39 
36  0.075*** 0.186  4.880 147  0.431*** 0.091 24.970 28 
 t-statistic of the difference of the two sample CARs over the 36 month period is  
 3.03*** 
Panel B China 
Month 
2003-2007 2008-2012 
CAR StdDev t-stat Size CAR StdDev t-stat Size 
12  -0.106*** 0.125 -15.883 351  -0.014*** 0.102 -3.817 798 
24  -0.052*** 0.118 -8.312 351  -0.001 0.081 -0.261 519 
36   0.050*** 0.141  6.597 351   0.250*** 0.250 34.942 171 
t-statistic of the difference of the two sample CARs over the 36 month period is 
3.31*** 
Panel C South Korea  
Month 
2003-2007  2008-2012 
CAR StdDev t-stat Size CAR StdDev t-stat Size 
12  -0.009 0.156 -1.094 331  0.097*** 0.173   9.379 282 
24   0.091*** 0.179  9.215 331  0.199*** 0.147 18.295 204 
36   0.189*** 0.136  25.165 331  0.505*** 0.126 41.512 109 
t-statistic of the difference of the two sample CARs over the 36 month period is 1.77* 
Panel D Malaysia  
Month 
2003-2007 2008-2012 
CAR StdDev t-stat Size CAR StdDev t-stat Size 
12   -0.036*** 0.128 -4.291 231  -0.115*** 0.111 -9.670 87 
 24   -0.185*** 0.147  -19.215 231  -0.203*** 0.088  -18.064 61 
36   -0.258*** 0.162  -24.248 231  -0.309*** 0.140  -13.057 35 
t-statistic of the difference of the two sample CARs over the 36 month period is 0.74 
Notes:  
Cumulative average benchmark- adjusted abnormal return (CAR) over 12, 24 and 36 month period is the sum of 
the monthly average market-adjusted abnormal returns during the relevant period. 
*, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Thai IPOs - Cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns for pre-
crisis (2003-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2013) periods  
 
 
Figure 2: Chinese IPOs - Cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns by 
month for pre-crisis (2003-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2013) periods  
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Figure 3: South Korean IPOS - Cumulative average benchmark-adjusted 
returns for pre-crisis (2003-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2013) periods   
 
 
 
Figure 4: Malaysia - Cumulative average benchmark-adjusted returns for pre-
crisis (2003-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2013) periods 
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